

ER 60-8562/a

NOV 1960

card
Honorable Hugh S. Canning, Jr.
The Director of Intelligence and
Research
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Ambassador Canning:

In the absence of Mr. Dulles, I would like to
acknowledge and thank you for your letter of
3 November and for the enclosed Intelligence Estimate
No. 100 on "Second-Stage Nationalism."

When Mr. Dulles returns to his office, this will
be brought to his attention.

Sincerely,

Signed


Assistant to the Director

O/DCI  bak(7 Nov. 60)

Distribution:

- Orig.&l - Addressee
- ✓ 1 - AAB w/basic & encl. for hold file
- 1 - ER via Reading

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *State*)

State Department review completed

Handwritten signature/initials

Mr. Dulles:

As you recall, when you looked over the attached report, you wanted to know what offices in the Agency had received this particular estimate. For your information, it was distributed as follows:

1 copy	OCR Library
1 copy	OBI
4 copies	ORR
1 copy	DDI/SRS
4 copies	ONE
1 copy	<input type="text"/>
1 copy	FDD
1 copy	<input type="text"/>
6 copies	DD/P
2 copies	OTR
5 copies	OCI

27 copies	Total

STAT

STAT

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON

60-8261

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 10 1960

Dear Allen:

I would like to call your attention to the attached brief Intelligence Estimate No. 100 on "Second-Stage Nationalism," which was prepared by my Estimates Group. It provides, I think, some perceptive insights into the causes and manifestations of a variety of present day nationalistic phenomena, including particularly the post-liberation nationalism of the "nation in a hurry." I hope you will find it useful.

Sincerely,



Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.

Attachment:

IE No. 100

The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

Intelligence Report

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

No. 100

SECOND-STAGE NATIONALISM



BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

Prepared by the Estimates Group

Approved by
The Director of Intelligence and Research

26 October, 1960

THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN

Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000900080024-1

SECOND-STAGE NATIONALISM *

1. Nationalism can be defined in terms as simple as sheer patriotism, and again in terms so all-embracing as to constitute a whole philosophy of life. There is ample reason for this confusion. Nationalism is actually complex and comprehensive, yet at times it may be dominated by some one of its component themes to such an extent that the complex seems unified and simple. Nationalism has in the last century and a half focused primarily upon the nation-state, yet its essential elements have been effective throughout history, and they manifest themselves at all times in many contexts other than those of nation or state, and in just about all stages of political development. We are becoming aware, also, that the nation-state itself is no uniform thing, and we see that states in different situations and contexts will arouse different emphases and combinations of elements within the protean compass of nationalism. An understanding of this matter therefore requires the drawing of distinctions and an examination of times and places.

2. To start, however, with a generality, let us attempt one basic definition. Nationalism is to be regarded as essentially a force -- a social drive that may be thought of as a common popular feeling or stimulus to action, centered on concepts of the nature and purpose of the social group. Deep impulses underlie this feeling, notably the disposition of the individual to identify himself with the group; these impulses attach themselves to a wide variety of symbols, such as cultural, or linguistic distinctiveness, or perhaps a particular religious doctrine. We can, however, establish the limitation that in the modern world this social group will typically be the nation -- a group, united by a variety of bonds, that is of a size and quality suited to embodiment as a defensible sovereign state -- and the main stimulating symbols will center upon sovereign statehood itself.

3. It is this combination of scope and association with nation and state that is distinctive. If we look at the components of nationalism we find that its content is no more than a compound of feelings and motives familiarly observable in many other relationships. Hatred of foreigners, for example, cannot as a feeling be distinguished from antagonisms that frequently prevail between sections or localities of a single country. Racial antagonism, an integral theme of nationalism in Hitlerite Germany, is looked upon as mere localized prejudice when it shows up amongst the Teddy Boys and Jamaican immigrants of Notting Hill, London. Suspicion of rich capitalists nourishes the newly inflamed nationalism of Cuba, to mention only one such outcropping, but it may be found also in the attitude of many a U.S. country village toward city slickers. We need hardly illustrate the incidence of snobbish convictions of superiority to others or the humble search for security in numbers, of appetites for aggrandizement or willingness to make great sacrifices for an ideal -- all these qualities characterize nationalism as well as other aspects of social life.

Clearly, then,

* See also forthcoming Intelligence Estimate No. 101 for an analysis of second-stage nationalism in Indonesia and Cambodia.

Clearly, then, we are examining human motives and drives which appear separately or diversely combined in many areas of action, and which become nationalism by virtue of being displayed on a national scale -- or, more precisely, when aroused by concerns of a national group.

4. The association with the nation-state distinguishes this complex of feelings in yet another way, by fostering an unprecedented scope and intensity in the forces involved. As states modernize, reasonably uniform education extends to remote settlements of the people and inculcates common social symbols, ideals, and traditions, so that the nationalist appeals elicit increasingly wide and ready response. Media like the press, and more recently the radio and television, lend themselves to long-term training or whirlwind campaigns of excitation. In one generation, Germany, Italy, Russia, and China have shown how the modern state can develop a forced-draft leadership group, a Party, which draws out from the population the elements most suited to the regime's purpose and strenuously indoctrinates them with a master-theme of nationalism. In effect, the state can distill, centralize, and intensify the nationalist forces that permeate the population as a whole. So it is that while the national group arouses nationalism in simple terms, the organization of the group into a state produces the further intensification of this force that is so characteristic of modern history -- and that may in return be a necessary condition for the effectiveness of the modern state itself.

5. Indeed, it cannot be by chance that the self-conscious nationalism with which we are familiar came into the view of history at just the time that the nation-state was being forged. One small paragraph can do no more than point out that modern nationalism traces back to the age when the French Revolution opened to men's minds new ideals toward which society could aim, while it showed them on a more practical basis the tremendous actions which the state could actually perform. It was, at the same time, the age when the industrial revolution tore men from accustomed traditions and set them loose in search of a new association, when the writings of Rousseau, the German philologists and romanticists, as well as many other elements came together to form a framework of thought and a mystique which shaped social pressures into nationalism -- a force which sought to realize its objectives in and through the state.

6. At the same time, the concerns of national groups or states differ; in varying situations and circumstances the concept of the nation will be associated with different specific goals. During a war the concern of the nation and its members is defense or conquest. Before liberation of one group from domination by another, the concern is independence. In fact, these two sets of situations and responses are the ones which the concept of nationalism instantly brings to mind as typical. We are now, however, becoming interested in what happens during peace-time and after liberation, for it appears that an established peaceful sovereign state may generate new goals which distinctively re-shape the nationalist drive. The implementing of independence will center about goals of status and perhaps unity for the nation, and these goals stir responses which differ importantly from the feelings aroused in a struggle for independence or for existence.

7. The nationalism

7. The nationalism of liberation focuses essentially on winning state-hood, on making a state -- in short, to an important degree on the externalized goal of creating an institution. In the complex of feelings which stirs people to drive toward the goal of liberation, the predominating tone is set by the positive ideal of loyalty -- selflessness to the point of sacrifice -- and by the negative but reasonably simple stimulus of antagonism to the oppressor. Status, on the other hand, and the sense of unison with one's kind are goals of far more subjective character, liable to diverse interpretation and very personal fulfillment. Wounded feelings, inferiorities, frustrations, and similar complex factors are of course at work in the process of liberation, but they will assume greater importance in a group that is pressing for status, and especially so when the group finds itself disappointed in the expectation that status will automatically accompany independence. As emphasis increases on motivations of this sort, we need not be surprised to find a nationalism of more varied content, less definite, more confusing.

8. The temptation is great to regard these forms of nationalism as chronologically successive, and to identify them as stage one and stage two in a sequence that nation-states should normally be expected to follow. Manifestly, the nation must be independent before it can begin to compete for status with other sovereign states. A freedom movement may have problems of cohesion and internal unity, but any problems of this sort will grow far more intense after the movement has gained its freedom and formed a state. On the other hand, there is the curious fact that a lull of considerable length may intervene between liberation and the quest for status -- or at least it used to be so. Many countries have for long periods happily remained in the second class (or lower) of international standing; their intoxication with status may develop long after they acquire independence. Cuba is a case in point. Italian fascism and its preoccupation with status followed a long period of comparative benignity. With this caution it is nonetheless convenient to identify what we are talking about as "second-stage nationalism" -- the nationalism that follows the stage of liberation and is associated with the implementing of national independence.

9. Indeed, there may well be other "stages," equally susceptible to interpretation as a sequence. What are the goals of a nation that has achieved, or is achieving, the internal criteria of status -- that has built up its economic production, its standard of living, its population in both numbers and proficiency, to the point of gaining recognition as a respectable power? If it has not already done so on the way, will it not begin to set itself goals in what could be called the external criteria of international status -- geographic expansion, alliances, extension of influence, even to the point of military adventurism? And will these goals not imply new tones of nationalism, with dominating notes of racial or cultural superiority, manifest destiny, obligation toward groups of fellow nationals which have not yet been brought within the sacred frontier of the state? The USSR, complicated though its actions are by the ramifications of a universal ideology, is doubtless best fitted of present countries to illustrate the traits of a nation that is feeling its oats.

10. By the same

10. By the same token, goals may shift again for the state that has passed through the experience of making itself a power to be reckoned with, that has convinced itself and others of its established status. Perhaps yet another form of nationalism will come to be identified in a nation that, after a strenuous past, finds itself at last hemmed in, confronted by challenges which it does not wish to or cannot overcome. That nation's goals will tend to shift toward conservation rather than growth, sliding around obstacles rather than overcoming them, preferring domestic consumption to external action. The nationalism of this country will be muffled, sounding vague themes of sorrowful pride rather than notes of sharp and aggressive confidence.

11. Again, however, a word of caution. It is far from our purpose to set forth a pat sequence, still less to suggest a cyclical rise and fall of the state. There may, as already pointed out, be gaps or lulls between stages. Numerous Latin American countries seem to have had longer or shorter periods of sleep after the initial impulse of liberation. In Cuba, perhaps also Guatemala, a fresh display of radical nationalism occurred not in consequence of newly won independence, but in association with situations which variously combined liberation from indigenous tyranny with the outbreak of social revolution. The Italian plunge into extremes of fascist nationalism came sixty years after liberation, amid a combination of military embarrassment, post-war social confusion, and economic distress. Nazism similarly gained power after long years of lost status and in the wreckage of the Great Depression. The evidence is mixed, but the element of loss of face and narrowing opportunity seems to be a common denominator in the European experience of this concentrated nationalism. On the other hand, it appears that the reverse situation may also reinvigorate nationalist drives, and it may be found that outbursts of these impulses are in part stirred by the realization of new opportunity after a period of stagnation. Meiji Japan and extremist pre-War Japan may perhaps be seen in this light. The problem of causation, however, opens a new, vast subject. Let it suffice that primitive states like Guinea, underdeveloped states like Egypt, and elderly states like France may suddenly shift among these forms of nationalist expression, or repeat them, in ways that warn us against taking too seriously any fixed and logical sequence. Nonetheless, it remains convenient to speak at least of first-stage and second-stage nationalism, if only to distinguish the latter and allow us to address ourselves to it.

12. Second-stage nationalism, then, is that social drive or force that is aroused by concepts of national status and national unity. It is the response to goals set by a nation in a hurry. And it quite naturally at the same time reflects the ethos of its day. In extreme form it conveniently reveals itself for examination in Guinea, a new and primitive state, and in Cuba, a Western society which has been self-determining for two generations. There are many less agitated illustrations, like India, which will repay examination. From what may be called the pathological extremes, it is possible to sketch a group of characteristics which, in combinations of varying emphasis and intensity, can in general be considered to represent second-stage nationalism.

13. One conspicuous

13. One conspicuous trait will be a competitive antagonism. While much may be said about cooperation and unity in the areas of newly liberated states, these countries are, in the end, jostling for position, and can hardly escape rivalries and jealousies in the process. Overlaps of ethnic groups between states, and the disintegrating trends that often follow a national effort for liberation or the removal of a colonial strait jacket, facilitate the generating of feuds and bickerings. Concentration of antagonisms against the metropole quickly gives way to greater diversity of targets; hard feelings will usually turn against at least one neighbor, and may, indeed, be so diverted as almost to exculpate the original colonial power though the generalized antipathy to colonialism will not change.

14. An authoritarian tone not only reflects the culture and tradition of many areas, but naturally suits their concept of a young nation with much to do. Many societies regard democracy as a clumsy mechanism, hard to work by a people not well accustomed to it, and one which has lost the unique prestige it enjoyed before the World Wars. Colonial territories will often emerge from the effort at liberation with some well-established leader, whose repute and position encourage the growth of personalism. In some degree, doubtless, some strongly centripetal force is required for the sheer survival of an untried nation. Certainly, the sense of unexpected, overwhelming problems, the frustrations likely to flow from them, and the general insecurity felt by peoples who are being swept along in a period of radical change, all work to focus aspirations for progress and unity about some outstanding personality, whose autocratic power comforts the public, satisfies its sense of how government should work, and often is in accord with traditional leadership concepts.

15. This is not to say that emerging colonies or other growing nations will throw away all democratic institutions or will fail to develop some of their own, albeit in often novel forms. Nor is it to be thought that any such forms are negligible as present restraints or promises for the future. But the balance between representative and autocratic institutions will in many cases incline to favor the latter. In any case, each country will make its own selection and balance, and it will be a point of national pride to imitate slavishly none of the prevailing patterns, but to blend bits and pieces of several with indigenous inventions.

16. Under the need to stress unity and discipline, radical regimes may well display elements common to totalitarian fascist and communist organization. They may promote the single party, whereby leader and people progress together in freedom from the impediments of political debate or criticism that could only be carping! As a corollary there will be trends toward mass movement, with reminiscences of Nuremberg rallies or Russian and Chinese official campaigns of propaganda and huge, planned, "spontaneous" demonstrations. Behind institutions of this sort, which intensify authoritarianism, lie not only purposeful political exploitation, but also the sense of vulnerability, of defencelessness in confrontation with great powers, and perhaps also of internal susceptibility to divisive pulls by the protagonists of the cold war. Authoritarian institutions thus reflect a search for social unison, an urge to mass participation, which are common elements of second-stage nationalism.

17. By the same

17. By the same token, this nationalism comprises a vigorous belief in state planning and action in all spheres, with especial emphasis upon social welfare and economics. The picture of communism as it is generally accepted will in these fields be attractive and explicit to a generation of new leaders heavily influenced through education by Marxian social and economic thought. The desire to build up the state, the sense of need to accomplish big things, will combine with the notion that state action is the proper mode of action, to make of these principles a strongly desired pattern.

18. The counterpart of this trend will appear in suspicion of private enterprise, especially Western economic enterprise. Throughout the colonial areas, it was common understanding that local poverty traced to exploitation by the business interests of the colonial power -- and in respect of these views Latin America counts as a colonial area. There is a more or less explicit apprehension of the dictum about trade and the flag, but in the sense that either one will follow the other. Private enterprise has domestically the connotation of economic inequality, externally that of foreign intrusion, and on both counts it touches a vigorous negative chord in second-stage nationalism.

19. This negative quality spreads naturally to the field of international diplomacy, where it manifests itself as neutralism. New countries have not gained their personality only to subordinate it at once to some protector. In a polarized world, furthermore, to adopt an independent bargaining position comes as instinctively to new weak countries as eating does to a day-old chick. The great issues will be settled without their help; their duty is to milk the situation for anything they can get, especially in the way of arms, to bolster what individuality they have. Surely few impulses can be more solidly imbedded in the complex of feelings which urges a national group forward in the implementation of its independence.

20. Thus many strains appear among the elements of second-stage nationalism. Socialism, communism, fascism, democracy, authoritarianism, and neutralism -- in one way or another these and other familiar motifs combine in the expression of this force. There will, of course, be found many features of the older, or first-stage, nationalistic pattern, notably pressures to revivify indigenous cultures, accompanied inevitably by pressures to overcome the resulting danger that the state will shatter into fragments; there will be religious revivals, and high idealistic strivings. Each country, moreover, will differ, each will mix in some quantity of its own indigenous elements. Much will depend on the openness of the situation, on the extent to which revolutionary impulse is weakening the hold of tradition as a delaying factor. Few new and underdeveloped countries will be found which do not display at least traces of all these elements.

State - RD Wash., D.C.